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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 20000278-CA 
vs. : 
Priority No. 2 
KEVIN R. GRONAU, : 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The State appeals from the district court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress 
and subsequent dismissal of a second degree felony charge of possession of marijuana, in 
the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 
58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) arid 58-37-8(4)(x) (1998). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (1999) and § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Whether an automobile may be found to have been "seized" for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment based solely on a police officer's testimony that he subjectively 
believed that the automobile was detained, even though the officer did not communicate 
that belief to the automobile's owner, and did not interfere with the owner's possession 
of the automobile in any way. 
Standard of Review. The trial court's ruling that a seizure occurred under the 
undisputed facts of this case is a legal conclusion reviewed for correctness. Salt Lake 
City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, If 8, 998 P.2d 274. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in 
the presence of a minor (R.2). Defendant moved to suppress the state's evidence 
obtained as a result of a search of his automobile (R.21), and the trial court granted the 
motion (R.53) (Addendum A). The trial court denied the state's request to reconsider its 
decision (R.81), and the charge was dismissed at the state's request based upon the 
court's finding that the suppression of the evidence substantially interfered with the 
state's ability to proceed (R.84). The State filed a timely notice of appeal (R.86). 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Highway Patrol Sergeant Paul Mangelson was patrolling 1-15 south of Nephi, 
Utah, when he stopped an automobile driven by defendant for speeding. The speed limit 
on the highway is 75 miles per hour, and Mangeison's radar indicated that defendant was 
driving 80 miles per hour (R.93:6). Defendant's 17-year-old son was a passenger in 
defendant's car (R.53). 
Mangelson approached and asked to see defendant's driver's license and vehicle 
registration (R.93:7) (Addendum B, Suppression Hearing Transcript). Defendant's 
driver's license had a hole punched in it, indicating that the license was not valid. 
Defendant explained that he had left his valid license at home, and was using his old 
license for identification purposes (R.53; 93:8). Defendant was driving a rental car, and 
Mangelson inspected the rental agreement, noting that the car was one day overdue. 
Defendant told Mangelson that he had renewed the rental agreement over the phone 
(R.53; 93:11). During their conversation, Mangelson asked defendant whether he had 
ever been in trouble, and defendant responded by saying "I'm not a troublemaker" (R.53; 
93:9). Mangelson called dispatch to request confirmation that defendant had a valid 
driver's license and to obtain a criminal history of defendant (R.53; 93:9). 
JThe facts are recited here in "'a light most favorable to the lower court's 
findings.'" State v. Blevins, 968 P.2d 402,402 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. 
Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 147 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
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Dispatch confirmed that defendant had a valid driver's license, but was unable to 
respond immediately as to defendant's criminal history (R.53; 93:10). Mangelson issued 
a warning citation for speeding to defendant and told him that he was free to go (R.53; 
93:11). Defendant then drove to the next freeway exit and stopped at a truck stop. 
Mangelson followed him, and learned from dispatch that defendant had a prior drug 
arrest in 1991 (R.52; 93:14). Mangelson believed that this arrest indicated that defendant 
had lied to him earlier about his record, so when defendant left the truck stop, Mangelson 
followed him as he drove to a nearby restaurant (R.52; 93:15). As defendant stepped out 
of his car, Mangelson confronted defendant with the arrest information from dispatch 
and asked for permission to search defendant's car. Defendant refused, saying "No, you 
are not going to search my car. Me and my boy is going in and have breakfast. You can 
do whatever you want, but you are not going to search my car" (R.93:15). Mangelson 
told defendant that he was going to call in a drug-sniffing dog. Defendant said, "Do 
whatever you want.. We're going in for breakfast" (R.93:16). Defendant and his son 
then went into the restaurant where they remained for 25-30 minutes (Id.). Mangelson 
testified that although defendant was free to leave at that time, Mangelson did not intend 
to allow defendant to drive his car away (R.52; 93:16). 
While defendant and his son were inside the restaurant, Mangelson called dispatch 
and requested a drug-sniffing dog. Officer Alden Orme, the dog handler, brought the 
dog to the restaurant parking lot, and led the dog around defendant's car. The dog 
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alerted on the trunk of the car, indicating the possible presence of illegal narcotics 
(R.52). 
When defendant came out of the restaurant, Mangelson told him that the drug-
sniffing dog had indicated the presence of narcotics, and that although defendant was not 
detained, his car was being detained while a search warrant was obtained based upon the 
drug dog's alert (R.93:20). Defendant and his son then walked away and used a pay 
phone, and were picked up by another driver within a few minutes (R.53, 93:21). 
Mangelson had defendant's car towed to the sheriffs office, and a search warrant 
for the car was obtained (R.93:21). Mangelson searched the trunk of the car and found 
20 pounds of marijuana in a duffel bag (R.53, 93:21-22). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
For purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, a seizure of property only occurs 
when an officer meaningfully interferes with the owner's use of the property. An 
officer's uncommunicated intent to seize property does not interfere with the owner's 
possession or use of property, and is therefore irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis. 
In this case, the trial court's legal conclusion that a seizure occurred was based entirely 
on the court's finding that the officer had formed an intent to seize defendant's vehicle. 
However, it is undisputed that the officer did not tell defendant that his vehicle was 
seized at that point, and defendant's use of the vehicle was not interfered with in any way 
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by the officer until after the officer had probable cause for the seizure because a drug-
sniffing dog had alerted on the vehicle's trunk. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE OFFICER'S UNCOMMUNICATED INTENT TO SEIZE 
DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE DID NOT MEANINGFULLY 
INTERFERE WITH DEFENDANT'S POSSESSORY INTEREST IN 
THE VEHICLE AND THEREFORE DID NOT CONSTITUTE A 
SEIZURE UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The trial court below granted defendant's motion to suppress based solely upon its 
conclusion that defendant's automobile had been seized by Sergeant Mangelson without 
reasonable suspicion, and that this seizure was therefore improper under the Fourth 
Amendment (R.50). However, although the trial court recited the appropriate legal 
standard for determining whether property has been seized for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment (R.51), the trial court did not properly apply that standard to the facts of this 
case. 
The State does not dispute the factual findings of the trial court regarding the 
circumstances of the traffic stop and the conversation between defendant and Sergeant 
Mangelson. It is only the trial court's application of the Fourth Amendment legal 
standard for when a seizure occurs that is at issue in this appeal. On appeal, the trial 
court's ruling is therefore reviewed de novo for correctness. "[B]ecause the 
determination of whether an encounter with law enforcement constitutes a seizure under 
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the Fourth Amendment 'calls for consistent application from one police encounter to the 
next, regardless of the particular individual's response to the actions of the police,' such 
determination is a legal conclusion that we review for correctness." Salt Lake City v. 
Ray, 2000 UT App 55, f 8, 998 P.2d 274 (quoting State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 465 n.3 
(Utah CtApp. 1991)). 
A. Property is not seized under the Fourth Amendment unless an officer 
actually interferes with possession, without regard to the officer's 
uncommunicated intent 
As noted by the trial court, under the Fourth Amendment, "property is seized 
when 'there is some meaningful interference with the individual's possessory interests in 
that property.'" Finding of Fact and Order of Suppression, n. 1 (quoting Soldal v. Cook 
County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992)) (R.56). In order to find that an officer has seized 
property for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the evidence must show that the 
officer took some action with regard to the property which restricted the owner or 
interfered with the owner's use of the property in a meaningful way. For example, if a 
police officer informs a traveler that his luggage is being detained, this act constitutes a 
seizure because the officer's action interferes with the traveler's use and possession of 
the luggage, effectively preventing the traveler from leaving. United States v. Place, 462 
U.S. 696, 707 (1983) ("agents made a 'seizure' of Place's luggage for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment when, following his refusal to consent to a search, the agent told 
Place that he was going to take the luggage to a federal judge to secure issuance of a 
7 
warrant"); United States v. Hall, 978 F.2d 616, 619 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Tangible property 
is seized when a police officer exercises control over the property by removing it from an 
individual's possession, or when an officer informs an individual that he is going to take 
his property.") (citations omitted). 
Accordingly, a Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur unless the officer 
actually takes some action to interfere with the owner's use of the property, including 
informing the owner that the property is detained. It is only the consequences of the 
officer's actions with regard to the owner's use of the property that are relevant to the 
issue of seizure. Thus, even when an officer actually takes physical possession of 
luggage without permission, such an act is not a seizure unless the owner of the luggage 
is aware of the detention and is inconvenienced in some way as a result. United States v. 
Johnson, 990 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1993). In Johnson, officers took possession of 
Johnson's luggage after he had checked it with the airline, but had completed their 
investigation (including a drug-dog sniff) prior to the time when the luggage would 
otherwise have been loaded on the plane. "Because nothing that the officers did 
interfered with the appellant's possessory interest in his luggage prior to the dog sniffing, 
there was no seizure of the luggage." Id. 
Further, an officer's subjective intent to detain is irrelevant to the seizure issue, 
because an uncommunicated intention to detain property does not, of itself, interfere with 
the owner's possession or use of the property. An officer's uncommunicated intention to 
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seize or not to seize is not relevant to the court's Fourth Amendment analysis; it is only 
the officer's actions that determine whether a seizure has taken place. Salt Lake City v. 
Ray, 2000 UT App 55, K 13 n. 1, 998 P.2d 274 ("Officer Eldard testified that had Ray 
asked for the return of her identification so she could leave, he would have allowed her 
to do so. Because the record shows no indication that Officer Eldard communicated this 
subjective intention to Ray, it is irrelevant to our analysis.") (citing United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 544 n. 6 (1980) ("[T]he subjective intention of the [officer] is 
irrelevant except insofar as that may have been conveyed to the respondent.") and State 
v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah App. 1996) ("[R]egardless of the circumstances, 
'[t]he test for when [a] seizure occur[s] is objective and depends on when the person 
reasonably feels detained, not on when the police officer thinks the person is not longer 
free to leave.'") (quoting State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991))). See also 
State v. Chevre, 2000 UT App 6,18,994 P.2d 1278 (a police officer's alleged 
"unconstitutional motivation" for traffic stop is irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis) 
(citing State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1132 (Utah 1994)). 
B. The trial court improperly relied solely upon the officer's 
uncommunicated intent in finding that a seizure occurred. 
In ruling that a seizure occurred in this case, the trial court relied on the following 
testimony of Officer Mangelson from the suppression hearing: 
Q. What did you say to [defendant]? 
9 
A. I told him that dispatch had advised me that he had a drug arrest in 
1991; and I told him what my suspicions were, that I suspected that he was 
transporting narcotics. 
Q. And what did he say? 
A. He got very hostile and told me that I was harassing him and that type 
of thing. 
And I said, "Well, do you mind if I check your car?" 
And he said, "No, you are not going to search my car." He said, 
"Me and my boy is going in and have breakfast. You can do whatever you 
want, but you are not going to search my car." 
And I said, "Well, what I am going to do is I am going to call Alden 
Orme, a Nephi City dog handler; and I will have him run his dog around 
the car." 
And he said, "Do whatever you want. We're going in for breakfast." 
Q. Was the defendant free to leave at this point? 
A. He was. 
Q. Had he gotten in his car and traveled down the freeway, would you 
have detained him further? 
A. Well, when I say the defendant is free to go, I'm not saying that his car 
was free to go. I was going to obtain a search warrant for the car, and 
eventually that's what I did. 
Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Suppress, pp. 15-16 (R.93:15-16). Officer 
Mangelson also denied having told defendant that his vehicle was detained (R.93:32). 
Thus, although the officer's testimony implies, as the trial court found, that 
"Gronau was not free to take the vehicle" (R.50), that finding alone is not sufficient to 
support the court's legal conclusion that the vehicle was "seized" for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment. The trial court did not make any finding that defendant knew of the 
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officer's intent to detain, or that the officer took any action that interfered in any 
"meaningful" way with defendant's possession or use of the vehicle, and no evidence 
exists to support such a finding. Defendant had already parked and exited his car when 
Mangelson approached him (R.93:15). Defendant denied the officer permission to 
search his car, and told Mangelson that he was going into the restaurant for breakfast, as 
he had originally intended to do (Id.). Although Mangelson may have at that point 
decided to prevent defendant from driving the car away, the trial court did not make a 
finding that Mangelson communicated this intent to defendant, and Mangelson denied 
having told defendant of his intent to detain the vehicle (R.93:32). Compare Hall, 978 
F.2d at 620 (seizure occurred because the officer informed defendant that he was 
detaining her luggage, and defendant thereby "lost free access to her suitcase and was 
meaningfully deprived of her possessory interest in the suitcase"). 
Mangelson did not take any action to interfere with defendant's use of the vehicle 
until after the drug-sniffing dog's alert on the vehicle's trunk. By the time defendant 
finished his breakfast and came out of the restaurant, Mangelson not only had reasonable 
grounds to detain defendant and his vehicle, but also had full probable cause to search 
the vehicle. See Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (exposure of luggage to trained canine sniff "did 
not constitute a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment"); United States v. 
Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 205 (10th Cir. 1990) (dog sniff identification of drugs 
11 
provides probable cause for search of vehicle); State v. May cock, 947 P.2d 695, 697 
(UtahApp. 1997) (same). 
The Fourth Amendment protects the rights of persons, not objects, and when an 
officer's actions with regard to property do not "meaningfully interfere" with the owner 
of the property, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated. The trial court did not make 
any finding that defendant's use or possession of the vehicle was interfered with, and the 
evidence presented at the suppression hearing does not support such a finding. 
Accordingly, the undisputed facts of this case do not support the trial court's legal 
conclusion that a seizure occurred in violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, the trial court's dismissal of this case based upon its ruling 
on defendant's motion to suppress should be reversed, and the case remanded for further 
proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this^^day of August, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
SCOTT KEITH WILSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 




CASE NO. 981600200 
DATE: August 27, 1999 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
LAW CLERK: Gunda Jarvis 
This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Having received 
and considered the Motion, together with memoranda in support of and opposition to the Motion, 
the Court hereby grants the Motion and delivers the following Memorandum Decision. 
Statement of Facts 
On December 16,1998, Sergeant Paul Mangelson stopped a black Nissan, Colorado license 
plate No. ACT2993, for speeding. The vehicle was occupied by the driver, defendant Kevin R. 
Gronau, and his son. Officer Mangelson asked for and received Gronau's drivers license, which had 
a hole punched in it. Officer Mangelson questioned Gronau about the hole, and was told by Gronau 
that he had left his current license at home, and used the expired license with the hole punch for 
identification purposes. Gronau further informed Officer Mangelson that the car was a Hertz rental 
car and provided Officer Mangelson with the rental agreement. The rental agreement was over due 
by one day, and upon questioning, Gronau informed Officer Mangelson that he had called Hertz and 
renewed the contract. Officer Mangelson contacted dispatch to run a criminal check on Gronau. 
Officer Mangelson asked Mr. Gronau, "Have you ever been in any trouble." To which the defendant 
replied, ccNo. I'm not a troublemaker." (See Video at 9:12 a.m.) While he was waiting for the report 
to come back, Officer Mangelson issued Gronau a warning notice for speeding and told Gronau that 
he was free to go. 
F,LED
 „ Fourth Judicial District Court of 
Wasatch County, State of Utah 
C W J A B. SMITH, Clerk 
Gronau drove away, took exit 222 into Nephi City, and turned into the Circle C truck stop. 
Shortly after Gronau drove into the truck stop, the dispatcher reported to Officer Mangelson that 
Gronau had a prior criminal history. 
Shortly thereafter, Gronau left the Circle C and drove to the south side of Milkelson's Cafe, 
which is also in Nephi City. As Gronau stepped out of the vehicle Officer Mangelson pulled up 
behind him and confronted him with the information received from dispatch. Officer Mangelson told 
Gronau that he suspected him of transporting narcotics and asked permission to search the car. 
(Suppression Hr'g at 15.) Gronau refused to consent to a search and entered the restaurant. Id. 
Officer Mangelson informed Gronau that he was going to have a drug dog brought out to check out 
the car for drugs. Officer Mangelson testified in the Suppression Hearing that while Gronau himself 
was free to leave, his car was not. (Suppression Hr'g at 16.) 
Subsequently the dog handler, Officer Alden Orme, arrived on the scene with his police 
dog. He took it around the car and the dog alerted to the trunk area of the car, indicating the possible 
presence of illegal narcotics. 
Officer Mangelson proceeded to contact Hertz Rental Company through dispatch, but did 
not actually talk with Hertz himself. Hertz authorized Officer Mangelson to detain the vehicle. When 
Gronau exited the restaurant Officer Mangelson informed him that the vehicle would be detained 
because the drug dog alerted to the possible presence of drugs in the trunk of the vehicle. Gronau 
refused to hand over the keys and went across the street to a gas station to make some phone calls. 
He received a ride from a person who was driving a Ford pickup. 
Upon obtaining a written search warrant, Officer Mangelson searched the vehicle and found 
in the trunk of the vehicle 20 pounds of marijuana in a black duffel bag. 
Ruling 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: "the right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. CONST, amend. IV; see also UTAH CONST, art. I, § 12. The 
concern of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent "unreasonable" or unjustified searches and seizures; 
"reasonable" searches and seizures are constitutionally valid. 
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In Utah, an officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if the stop is "incident 
to a traffic violation committed in the officer's presence." State v. Talbot. 792 P.2d 489,491 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). "[A]n officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license and 
vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation." State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 
431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Once the reasons for the initial stop have been satisfied, however, 
the individual must be allowed to proceed on his or her way. "Once the driver has produced a valid 
driver's license and evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, 'he must be allowed to proceed on his 
way, without being subjected to further delay by police for additional questioning.'" State v. Lopez. 
873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), auotim State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Any further detention after the fulfillment of the purpose for the initial stop is justified only if the 
detaining officer has a reasonable suspicion of serious criminal activity. See State v. Robinson. 797 
P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
The protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment to individuals also applies to personal 
property. Soldal v. Cook County. 506 U.S. 56, 62 (1992). Property can be seized "where law 
enforcement authorities have probable cause to believe that a container holds contraband or evidence 
of a crime." United States v. Place. 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983). Moreover, the Fourth Amendment 
protects property even when an identifiable privacy or liberty interest is not implicated. Katz v. 
United States. 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967). "More generally, an officer who happens to come across 
an individual's property in a public area could seize it only if the items are evidence of a crime or 
contraband."1 Soldal 506 U. S. at 68. The Supreme Court has held that even plain view seizures must 
satisfy the Fourth Amendment, holding that if the item's incriminating character is not immediately 
apparent, then the seizure will be deemed unreasonable. Soldal 506 U.S. at 69. 
There is no dispute that the initial stop was legal. However, the Court finds that the 
purposes of the stop were completed when Officer Mangelson issued Mr. Gronau a warning for 
speeding and Gronau drove away. The second encounter and subsequent seizure of Gronau's vehicle 
was unconstitutional. 
Property is seized when "there is some meaningful interference with an individual's 
possessory interests in that property." Soldal 506 U.S. at 61 citing United States v. Jacobsen. 466 
U.S. 109(1984). 
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The State claims that the second encounter was a Level I encounter that did not amount 
to a detention. The Court disagrees. Officer Mangelson, detained Gronau's vehicle and admitted that 
Gronau was not free to take the vehicle. Seizure of a property is a Level II encounter which requires, 
at the least, an articulable suspicion. 
Officer Mangelson claims that he had a reasonable suspicion to seize the vehicle because 
Gronau lied to him about his previous criminal history. However, the facts, including the video, show 
that Officer Mangelson asked Mr. Gronau, "Have you ever been in any trouble." To which the 
defendant replied, "No. I'm not a troublemaker." Assuming, arguendo, that Gronau did lie about his 
criminal history, i.e. a drug arrest in 1991 and a traffic ticket in 1995, this does not give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Therefore, Officer Mangelson did not have an articulable 
suspicion of criminal activity to justify the second encounter with Gronau or to seize his personal 
property. 
Due to the fact that Officer Mangelson did not have an articulable, reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity, the vehicle was wrongfully seized and the subsequent search pursuant to the Search 
Warrant was unconstitutional. Therefore, all evidence discovered during the search must be 
suppressed. 
Order 
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby granted. 
DATED this 2-7 day of August, 1998. 
cc: David O. Leavitt, Juab County Attorney 




exact date -- by a technician. I have the records --
MR. SHARP: I'm going to object to the 
answer. It's not responsive, and it's getting into 
hearsay. 
THE COURT: Well, it hasn't yet. 
MR. SHARP: Well, he says what have you 
done -- what have you done -- and now he's starting to 
talk about what a technician has done. 
THE COURT: Respond to the specific question 
that was raised. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. What I did was on that 
particular day was turn the radar on, went through the 
check devices that the radar does automatically. The 
radar checked out, and the checks showed it was 
operating properly, and I proceeded to use it. 
feY MR. LEAVITT: 
Q. Thank you. 
What happened after you stopped the vehicle? 
A. I approached the driver's side of the 
vehicle. I asked for a driver's license and 
registration to the vehicle, I believe. 
Q. And did he make any statements at that time 
regarding his speed? 
A. He did. He told me that he was going 77 
miles an hour. 
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Q. What did you say in response to that? 
A. I told him that the radar showed him at 80. 
I asked him for a driver's license, which he produced; 
and he stated that the vehicle was a rental vehicle. 
Q. Was there anything unusual about the driver's 
license? 
A. There was. 
Q. Please describe what that was. 
A. The license had a hole punched in it like you 
would take a paper punch, and it had been punched. 
Q. Why was that unusual to you? 
A. When a driver's license is turned in or 
renewed, the driver's license will punch a hole in it; 
and that designates that it's no longer a valid driver's 
license. 
Q. Did you suspect at that point that he may be 
operating a vehicle without a license? 
A. I did. 
Q. And what did you do after that? 
A. I questioned him a little bit about why the 
license had a hole in it, and he told me that he had 
asked for them back when he renewed his license, and 
they had given it back for him -- to him for ID 
purposes 
Q. And did you run a check on the license? 
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A. I did 
Q. When? 
A. Oh, a short time later. 
Q. Did anything occur between the time you took 
the license and asked him questions about the license 
and the time you did the computer check? 
A. I believe that I obtained the rental 
agreement from him, and I examined that. 
Q. Is that all part of your normal traffic stop? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Something you routinely do with most 
motorists? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. And did you return to your patrol car? 
A. I did eventually, yes. 
Q. And what did you do in your patrol car? 
A. I ran a check on the disposition of his 
driving status at that particular time. I also asked 
for a criminal history on the driver. 
Q. And why did you do that? 
A. He told me that he had never been arrested, 
never been in any trouble. He also told me that he had 
been to St. George to take his nephew back. He had his 
17-year-old son with him, and he stated that he had 
rented the vehicle, and he had simply gone to St. 
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George. 
I compared the odometer reading to the 
mileage out on the rental agreement, and there was a 
difference of 1700 miles. 
Q. How were you able to see the odometer? 
A. Simply by looking through the door of the car 
and looking at the odometer. 
Q. Did you place your head through the window 
area? 
A. Didn't need to 
Q. Okay. Did the criminal history check also 
show for possible arrest warrants? 
A. It would if he had any arrest warrants on 
him, yes. 
Q. Is that something you routinely do? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you get an answer back from the dispatch 
regarding the driver's license information and the 
criminal history? 
A. The information on the driver's license came 
back, and it did show that he had a valid license. His 
license was valid; however, the information on the 
criminal history did not return immediately. And why 
they were slow that day I have no idea, but it didn't 
come up for several minutes later. 
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Q. And so what did you do after that, in 
response to that? 
A. As I examined the rental agreement I also 
noticed that he was overdue on the rental by one day, 
and he told me that he had called the rental company and 
renewed that contract. 
I went ahead and issued a warning notice to 
him for the speed and was still waiting for the criminal 
record to come back. He was very nervous. He wanted to 
get going, told me he needed to use the restroom. 
Rather than hold him there any longer, I told 
him, if that criminal history came back, that I would be 
in contact with him; I would follow him on in; and I 
would let him go ahead and go on into the restroom. 
Q. When you said that, were you limiting what he 
could do, or was he free to do anything he wanted to do? 
A. He was free to do whatever he wanted to do. 
I simply told him, if it come back that he had a 
criminal history, that I would contact him. And he 
needed to use the restroom, and so, obviously --
Q. Why would you have contacted him if he had a 
criminal history? 
A. That would have told me that he was lying to 
me about his criminal history; and depending upon what 
that criminal history was for, that I wanted to go a 
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little bit further. 
Q. And why was that? 
A. Well, say, for example, if he had a criminal j 
history for auto theft, it could certainly be one step 
closer to the fact that he may have stolen this vehicle. 
If it was for drugs, then there's a good chance he may 
be transporting drugs. 
Q. Did you have any indicia that would 
indicate -- that made you suspect that he was smuggling 
drugs at this point? 
A. I did. 
Q. What were those things? 
A. The fact that he had rented this vehicle; 
made reference to me that he had taken his nephew back 
to St. George when, in fact, he had traveled a total of 
1700 miles. That certainly tells me that he's gone 
further than St. George. 
The fact that he's coming back from an area 
where drugs are prevalent. He's on Interstate 15 
northbound. He could have easily gone into Arizona, 
picked up drugs and be on his way back. The fact that 
he's going to have a criminal history for those drugs 
would be the straw that gets you over the hurdle of 
searching that vehicle. And that's certainly what I was 
trying to get back, was that criminal history, waiting 
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for it 
Q. You felt like that if the criminal history 
came back with something on it that you would have 
reasonable suspicion to detain him further? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And possibly receive a consent to search? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But you didn't feel like you had enough to 
detain him at this point? 
A. I really didn't at that point. 
Q. So you let him go? 
A. I did. 
Q. What would have happened had he not taken the 
Nephi exit and continued down the freeway into Utah 
County and then Salt Lake County? 
A. I probably would have followed him for a 
ways. I am not saying I would have followed him all the 
way to Salt Lake. I'm sure I would have followed him 
for maybe 10 or 15 miles waiting for that to come back. 
Q. But would you have made any other effort to 
detain him had he not taken the exit? 
A. Probably not. 
Q. Okay. What happened after you let him go? 
A. He took the south Nephi interchange, which 
is -- or exit -- which is 222. I remained on the 
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freeway where I could observe him. He pulled -- he made 
a left turn into the Circle C truck stop; and rather 
than pull into the front, he went around the north side 
of it real slow, looked like he was looking for somebody 
or something. He then went around the back of Circle C 
And then the next time I seen him was as he 
pulled to the front from the south side. While he was 
on the south side, he was out of my view. But as soon 
as he come to the front of the building, then I could 
see him again; and at that point he pulled into the 
front, and he and his son went into the business. He 
was in there a short time. 
At that point the dispatcher came back and 
give me the information on the criminal history. 
Q. What story did you receive from dispatch? 
A. The information I received was that he had 
had a drug arrest in 1991 and had a failure to yield in 
1994 . 
Q. And did that lead you to do anything after 
that? 
A. It did 
Q. What was that? 
A. He and his son came out. They got in the 
car, and I took the off ramp. He crossed the old 
highway. 
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Q. Going west? 
A. Going west and pulled into the south side of 
Milkelson's Cafe. 
Q. Where is that, in Nephi City? 
A. Yes. 
As he stepped out of the vehicle, I pulled in 
on about a 90-degree angle to the way his car was 
parked, and I confronted him with the information that I 
had gotten back from dispatch. 
Q. What did you say to him? 
A. I told him that dispatch had advised me that 
he had a drug arrest in 1991; and I told him what my 
suspicions were, that I suspected that he was 
transporting narcotics. 
Q. And what did he say? 
A. He got very hostile and told me that I was 
harassing him and that type of thing. 
And I said, "Well, do you mind if I check 
your car?" 
And he said, "No, you are not going to search 
my car." He said, "Me and my boy is going in and have 
breakfast. You can do whatever you want, but you are 
not going to search my car." 
And I said, "Well, what I am going to do is I 
am going to call Alden Orme, a Nephi City dog handler; | 
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and I will have him run his dog around the car." 
And he said, "Do whatever you want. We're 
going in for breakfast." 
Q. Was the defendant free to leave at this 
point? 
A. He was. 
Q. Had he gotten in his car and traveled down 
the freeway, would you have detained him further? 
A. Well, when I say the defendant is free to go, 
Ifm not saying that his car was free to go. I was going 
to obtain a search warrant for the car, and eventually 





But was the defendant free to go? 
He was free to go, yes. 
And what happened after you had this exchange 
A. He and his son went in the cafe. I donft 
know what they did. I assume they got some breakfast. 
They was in there for 25, 30 minutes. I had the dog 
handler come out, and he ran the dog around the car, and 
the dog alerted on the trunk area of the car. He 
scratched the paint off the rear bumper. 
MR. SHARP: Ifm going to object to him 
testifying as to his conclusions concerning the dog. 
The dog handler is apparently here and --
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observed 
THE COURT: He can testify to what he 
MR. SHARP: What he observed, yes. 
THE COURT: But to ask him conclusions about 
it -
BY MR. LEAVITT: 
Q. What did you observe the dog do when he began 
walking around the car? 
A. He smelled. He -- I believe that the dog 
handler started on the left side of the car. He went up 
to the left front, crossed the front, down the right 
side, and when he got around to the back bumper the dog 
went to scratching on the rear bumper. 
Q. How many times did he scratch? Do you know? 
A. Several, several times. 
Q. And what happened after that? 
A. During this time that the dog handler was 
checking the vehicle, I placed some phone calls to the 
rental company, and I talked to -- let me get this guy's 
name so I get it right. The fellow that we contacted 
was Mat Siska, and he's the assistant manager at Hertz. 
Q. Is that the rental agency there where the car 
was rented? 
A. Yes. He told me --
MR. SHARP: I'm going to object to this. And 
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may I proffer in doing so, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SHARP 
Q. He never told you anything, did he? 
A. He never told me directly. He told me via 
the dispatcher. 
Q. You're talking about hearsay at this point? 
A. Well --
Q. You never talked to Mat Siska, did you? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. You just said you did. But you never spoke 
with Mat Siska? 
A. Well, I think I said we talked to him, 
meaning the dispatcher. 
Q. But the point is you have never talked to Mat 
Siska? 
A. No, no. 
MR. SHARP: Thank you. 
It is hearsay, your Honor; and I object to 
it . 
THE COURT: Isn!t it hearsay, Mr. Leavitt? 
MR. LEAVITT: Excuse me? 
THE COURT: Isn't it hearsay? 
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MR. LEAVITT: It is. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) 
fcY MR. LEAVITT: 
Q. Based upon the dog's actions, Sergeant --
which I have haven't asked you to explain a conclusion, 
what conclusion you came to -- but did you take any 
further actions to investigate the contents of the car? 
A. I did. 
Q. And what did you do? 
A. I obtained a search warrant. 
Q. For the search of the car itself? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did the defendant leave the restaurant at 
some point? 
A. He did. 
Q. How far along in this process did that occur? 
A, He come out of the restaurant shortly after 
the dog handler had run his dog around it, and I talked 
to him. His words to me was, "Looks like the dog gave 
my car a clean bill of health." 
I said, "No, I don't believe so, but you are 
welcome to talk to the dog handler." 
And he talked to the dog handler, I believe, 
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and the dog handler explained to him --
MR. SHARP: I am going to object to what he 
believes the dog handler may have said. 
THE COURT: You may testify as to what the 
defendant said but not what the dog handler said. 
THE WITNESS: He talked to the dog handler. 
The dog handler is here, and he111 tell you what was 
said. 
I told him that he was free to go; the car 
was not free to go; I was going to get a search warrant 
for the car. 
And he then with his son walked over to the 
Tri-Mart Texaco station, which is just next door; and 
after a few minutes I walked over and asked him if he 
would give us the keys to the car. 
He said, "Ifll call my attorney, Mr. Sharp, 
and see what he says." 
He dialed -- or he used the pay phone there 
and got Mr. Sharp on the phone; and I, in fact, talked 
to Mr. Sharp on the phone. I asked him if he would give 
us the keys to the car, what the situation was, and he 
says, flNo, we're not going to give you nothing." 
I says, "Well, that will be fine. We won't 
need the keys." 
And at that point within minutes a car pulled 
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in, and he and his son caught a ride, and they left in 
that car. 
feY MR. LEAVITT: 
Q. You allowed them to leave? 
A. Yes, yes. 
Q. Did they appear to know the individuals who 
had stopped, or were they hitchhiking? 
A. I think they just asked for a ride when the 
guy pulled in for gas; but, here again, I donft know. 
Q. Did you then secure the warrant? 
A. I did. 
MR. LEAVITT: Your Honor, I believe the 
warrant and the affidavit should be on file. 
THE COURT: They are in the file. 
MR. LEAVITT: Thank you. 
BY MR. LEAVITT: 
Q. And what happened after you secured the 
warrant? 
A. I had a towing company tow the vehicle over 
to the sheriff's office. We couldn't move it because of 
the locking steering wheel. We towed it over there, and 
I had the dog handler stay with the vehicle while I 
obtained the search warrant. 
When we got the search warrant, we opened the 
vehicle, and in the trunk we found a black duffel bag 
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with approximately 20 pounds of marijuana in it. 
Q. Did you find anything else in other bags? 
A. I found items that belonged to both 
Mr. Gronau and his son. I found a court document with 
his son's name and age on it. 
Q. Any other incriminating evidence? 
A. I found a pair of Levis with a size 30 waist 
that appeared to be the kind of Levis that a teenager 
would wear. There was a small baggy of marijuana in 
them Levis. 
MR. LEAVITT: I think that's all I have of 
this witness at this time, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Sharp, 
cross-examination? 
MR. SHARP: Yes, your Honor. 
Do we have something to write with on this? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SHARP: 
Q. Sergeant Mangelson, what I want to do here is 
let's start with the stop that was out here on the 
highway. At that point you say you stopped him for 80 
in a 75, right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And you were suspicious of him. I assume the 
suspicions you had relate to 99 percent of the cars that 
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